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THE MIND IN THE MAJOR AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOL
Lee C. Bollinger*

Legal scholarship is significantly, even qualitatively, different from
what it was some two or three decades ago. As with any major change
in intellectual thought, this one is composed of several strands. The
inclusion in the legal academic community of women and minorities
has produced, not surprisingly, a distinctive and at times quite critical
body of thought and writing. The emergence of the school of thought
known as critical legal studies has renewed and extended the legal realist critique of law of the first half of the century. But more than
anything else it is the interdisciplinary movement in legal thought,
which began in the late 1960s and continues with unabated force to
this day, that has transformed the character of modem thinking about
law. Virtually every field of human knowledge is being mined for
what it can contribute to our understanding of the processes of law
and of legal issues.
For Judge Edwards these intellectual developments have adversely
affected the modem American law school, especially the "elite"
among them. He argues, in strong terms, 1 that within these institutions there is an unfortunate emphasis on pursuing abstract "theory"
at the expense of engaging in hard-headed, lawyerly analysis of legal
doctrine. The vantage point from which he issues this indictment is
primarily that of a judge: judges, he says, are getting less and less help
from legal scholarship as they try to decide the cases before them.
While Judge Edwards disclaims any desire to rid law schools entirely
of "theory," he makes no bones about his view that there is "too
much" of it and that a good deal of it is of poor quality as theory. He
• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. B.S. 1968, University of
Oregon; J.D. 1971, Columbia. - Ed. I am grateful to Richard Pildes, Yale Kamisar, Richard
Lempert, Jeff Lehman, and my son, Lee Bollinger Jr., for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this essay.
1. Judge Edwards claims that "many law schools - especially the so-called 'elite' ones have abandoned their proper place, by emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of practical
scholarship and pedagogy." Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992). He says that "the schools are
moving toward pure theory," id., and that the "reality" is that "many 'elite' law faculties in the
United States now have significant contingents of 'impractical' scholars, who are 'disdainful of
the practice of law.' " Id. at 35. "The proponents of the various 'law and' movements," Judge
Edwards says at one point, "generally disdain doctrinal analysis." Id. at 36.
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sees an excess of ambition over talent and suggests that law professors
would be better off sticking to what they do best - or, in any event,
better - which presumably is to analyze cases, organize fields of law,
and discover and criticize existing legal principles.
All this is bad enough, Judge Edwards laments, but compounding
this excessive theorizing in law schools is an attitude among would-be
"theorists" of disdain, even contempt, for those who plow the fields of
doctrine. This supposed attitude carries over into the classroom, and
with no small consequences. It is said to cause our graduates to feel
alienated from their professional lives; this alienation is in turn producing an increasingly unprofessional and unethical bar.
I think this diagnosis of a highly contagious and debilitating disease of "theory" in our major law schools, and of its supposed effects,
is seriously overdrawn - even to the point of being a fundamental
mischaracterizatfon - and is discouragingly unappreciative of the degree to which law schools have over the years become intellectually
invigorated - in a professional sense - by the expansion of knowledge and arguments now regarded as relevant to thinking about law.
There are several problematic layers in Judge Edwards' critique, but
the first is its offer of a basically flawed image of what law schools are
really like these days. Reading Judge Edwards' article, one comes
away with the impression that a majority of the faculty at these
schools has turned its back on its professional identity and given up
focusing on basic questions of law. This is simply not the case.
One way to correct this misimpression is to take a quick glance at
the monthly summary of publications contained in the Index To Legal
Periodicals. Just a brief review of the titles listed there provides a sobering antidote to the natural but nonetheless mistaken tendency to
fixate on what you do not like or on a few highly publicized incidents
or publications, and then to assume that the rest of the world is just
like that. The Index does not identify publications outside the realm
of traditional legal fora, so it does not provide us with a clear picture
of the potentially foregone opportunities for work on traditional legal
subjects. But it still reveals a rather remarkable array of writing evidently about "law" and doctrine, even by scholars from "elite" schools
for the "elite" law reviews.
The notion of a rampant turn within the legal academy towards
theory, or away from scholarly - or professional - engagement with
contemporary legal problems is also belied by a close examination of
my own faculty, which is generally regarded - and quite properly so
- as one of the centers of interdisciplinary legal research. Out of a
productive tenured faculty of about forty professors, eight are authors
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of major treatises; fifteen are authors of casebooks; at least twenty-five
have published works about significant and practical legal issues
within the last year or two; six - of whom only two are treatise authors - are engaged in major law reform efforts; and at least eighteen
- not including the last six - have been involved as consultants, advisors, or active participants in some concrete legal issue in the last
year. Yale Kamisar, the one member of the faculty who holds a university professorship, the highest honor bestowed within the school, is
the paradigm of the law professor concerned in his teaching and writing with careful analysis of legal issues. Thus, when you consider that
the Michigan faculty has the usual complement of legal historians five, though a couple are part-time - and legal philosophers - two you realize that the image of the law school as a group of second-rate
social theorists trying to imitate Habermas or Foucault is simply
wrong. The overwhelming majority of the faculty think of themselves,
and appropriately so, as professional legal scholars and teachers concerned- with understanding major legal problems in their fields.
Part of the problem with Judge Edwards' critique is the limited
perspective from which he assays the nature of contemporary legal
scholarship and service. If you look, as he does, primarily for law
review articles that offer immediate help to judges, you are bound to
underestimate the amount of very practical, relevant scholarship being
produced today. Not only does a good deal of ·contemporary legal
scholarship appear in forms other than the traditional law review article, but much of it is directed at other decisionmakers besides judges.
The propositions that imprisoning fathers who fail to pay child support deters delinquency, that lineups are less protective of defendants'
rights than showups, that a Michigan legislative program for citizens
to finance their children's higher education tuition costs is based on
unsound legal and financial premises - all theses put forth by Michigan faculty and all highly relevant to pressing social issues - may not
be particularly helpful to the federal judge but certainly are to other
decisionmakers.
I should also say that the "what-helps-a-judge" angle also leads
one to ignore or undervalue the degree to which those who advocate
major, or radical, reform of law are engaged - professionally engaged
-with legal issues. Judges are not revolutionaries, and they rarely go
beyond making interstitial changes in the law. And, for that reason,
they are not likely as a group to be especially receptive to, or to find
especially helpful, scholarship that is sharply critical of existing legal
norms. Hence, scholarly writings with a strong feminist, or critical
race, or critical legal studies perspective, much of which is highly spe-
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cific about legal doctrine, are not likely to be welcomed by the judge
laboring over an opinion. Here again, however, other decisionmakers
might feel differently.
I see this rather clearly in the First Amendment area. Some feminist and some critical race scholars advocate significant changes in the
existing First Amendment doctrine. They argue that the harms of
speech are greater than previously supposed, that the slippery slope of
new regulation is not as slippery as many think or is a risk worth
bearing, and that the interpretation of the Constitution ought to be
changed accordingly. I have noticed a tendency to try to discount
such attacks on conventional thinking by labelling them as "academic" or "abstract," even when they are quite as specific and concrete as the arguments presented by those who think the status quo is
just fine.
Now, to return to where I began, all this is not to say that there
have not been significant changes in the intellectual character of law
schools. There certainly have been. The greatest has been the interdisciplinary movement - a term I use deliberately. This is an intellectual shift so right, so compelling, as to be properly irreversible. Its
origins lie in a simple realization, namely that a number of fields possess knowledge of direct relevance to assumptions underlying law.
This is the same idea that led Lord Mansfield to seek the knowledge of
merchants in creating contract law. Indeed, it may be said that law
always speaks the language of other disciplines, and the only issue is
whether, as with Monsieur Jourdaiu, that comes as a surprise. To remain ignorant of relevant information about legal principles is to risk
not only making the law dumb but also making it an instrument of
social harm and injustice. 2 If it works well, and I believe in general it
has, the interdisciplinary movement improves the professional mission
of law schools. It makes scholarship more relevant, not less.
There can be no question that the depth of intellectual sophistication in law schools today is significantly greater than it was just a
couple of decades ago. There is a greater self-consciousness about law
as a human activity. Concepts and ideas, that were unknown then,
have been added to the standard working tools of legal scholarship
and teaching. By comparison, scholarship from earlier eras now often
seems formalistic, simplistic and even shallow. The audience about
2. To pay tribute to Professor Edwards, this was the basis for his very compelling arguments
about fashioning employment discrimination law in Race Discrimination in Employment: What
Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572. Only by understanding the historical and sociological
realities of racial discrimination in employment, he argued, can we then "fairly appraise some of
the current legal debates over appropriate remedies for job bias." Id. at 573.
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law has also greatly expanded. Serious bookstores now have sections
devoted to serious books about law. The special character of law - its
blending of theory and practice - together with the new openness
within the legal community to outside knowledge - has widened the
number and the types of participants in debates about legal issues. It
has also attracted some of the best people from other fields into the
legal community - yielding valuable contributions even to analysis of
doctrine. (The legal philosopher Don Regan on my faculty has published both a leading book of philosophy and a two-hundred page, definitive law review article on the Dormant Commerce Clause.)
Students are also better educated. Principles of economics, theories of
government and of finance, ideas about the nature of the human psychology, and so on, are part of their vocabulary and within their conceptual grasp.
To be sure, there are problems or potential problems with the interdisciplinary movement in legal tho~ght. First, there are certainly
failures. Some of the scholarship born of the interdisciplinary or other
movements is naive, even on occasion silly. Second, the question is,
and must constantly be raised, whether law is merely absorbing
wooden or simplistic versions of knowledge from the other disciplines.
Third is a risk that the sense of law as a discrete human enterprise,
having its own special character and definition as a discipline, will be
diminished or lost. We should worry about law merely becoming applied economics or philosophy. Fourth, with the increase in interdisciplinary knowledge, there also come the problems of internal
specialization within the legal community, producing the kind of babel
of incomprehensible languages that so troublingly besets the modem
university. Fifth, and finally, there is the basic question of the identity
assumed by law professors: are. we in our intellectual and emotional
hearts historians, philosophers, psychologists, literary critics first, or
are we intellectual participants in the profession of law?
All these risks I see as serious and worthy of attention, but I have
to say I do not see them as presently so serious as to undermine the
integrity of law schools as educational or .research centers for the profession. As for the scholarly flotsam that accompanies the new intellectual movements, my own view is that this has to be kept in
perspective. Almost any shift in thought of the dimensions we are
talking about here is a collective affair, involving many people exploring the same general territory. The less talented will always wish to
follow in the footsteps of the gifted. There will always be intellectual
hangers-on. They like and benefit from the association with those who
have achieved great things, even if that association exists only in their
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own minds. We possess, however, few effective means of separating
the weak from the strong at the outset. More to the point, though, is
the fact that exactly the same thing happens, now as well as in the
past, with doctrinal scholarship. There have always been mediocre or
poor doctrinal analysis and subjects that became disproportionately
fashionable for awhile, and for precisely the same reasons that there is
now a degree of poor "theory" scholarship.
It also remains to be seen what contributions to general knowledge
these movements will amass. On that the jury is still out. And it
probably should be out for some time. One must be careful not to
judge an intellectual shift of these dimensions too quickly. We are not
talking about trends that display their full effects in a year or two, or
perhaps even in a generation. And the general character of legal
scholarship is not static, but rather evolving. It is my sense, for example, that newer scholars are putting somewhat greater emphasis in
thinking about current legal issues than has been true of the middleaged scholars, who really ushered in the interdisciplinary movement.
Overall, though, my own firm belief is that law schools today are
institutions of high integrity. By that I do not mean only that law
professors, and students, work hard. Nor do I mean to say that law
schools as they are presently composed are necessary to an intelligent
and humane system of law. Indeed, they seem to me singular social
institutions. Society surely could train lawyers far more efficiently
than the law schools do. But we do something quite special. We take
virtually all of the potential entrants into the profession, before they
have done anything in law, before they have built up the kind of local
knowledge - what this judge is likely to do with that case, and so
forth - that tends to inhibit broad and idealistic thinking, and at the
very outset of their careers, when everything seems to have a kind of
magical aura, we introduce them to a wide body of knowledge about
law, resisting specialization; provide them with a base in the structures
of thought central to law; have them participate with very talented and
broad-minded people in approaching problem after problem after
problem in an special, independent atmosphere of critical inquiry; and
do all this in a setting suffused with a profound respect for the human
achievement of law. It is a rich, and I also think wise, culture that
operates in this fashion. It may make, or contribute, to making law as
central as it is to life in this society; but, given that law is that central,
it is certainly wise social policy to educate our lawyers in this way.
By integrity, then, I mean to say that the people involved - the
faculties - are personally committed to the kind of enterprise I have
just described. They work hard at achieving the aims of the institution
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as it is defined. Faculty prepare for classes, and their fatigue afterwards bespeaks their engagement. Faculty grade their students' examinations. 3 Faculty do research and writing, and do it themselves.
They are there at the birth of their articles and books. And, most
significantly, virtually all faculty, even the few who can be fairly described as purely "theoretical" - indeed, especially those faculty have a profound identification with the institution of law in the
society.
I think our most serious problem in modem legal education - and
here I am referring to the teaching and not the research function - is,
ironically, that it is not "theoretical" enough. The source of the problem is the continued dominance of the casebook as the primary form
of educational material in law schools. For all of the efforts to draw
upon the knowledge of related disciplines, legal scholarship has benefited from these efforts substantially more than legal education has
been enhanced. I do not mean to say that the interdisciplinary movement has left the classroom experience untouched. There are many
courses in today's law school curriculum that introduce the students
to other fields of knowledge. The number of courses entitled "law and
..." testifies convincingly to that. Nevertheless, the basic courses
within the first year oflaw school and the so- called core courses of the
second and third years continue, in my judgment, still to be organized
around the casebook method, which relies on the appellate court opinion as the principal focus of instruction. It is as if law schools are
stuck between the Langdellian revolution of the late nineteenth century and the interdisciplinary revolution of the late twentieth century.
Every law school struggles in one way or another with this fundamental problem. Deans set up special task forces on curriculum reform, which produce extensive reports the gist of which is that we do
not sufficiently integrate the knowledge we have about law into the
appellate-court-opinion-dominated curriculum, and the reports are
followed by many meetings and much debate, at the conclusion of
which very little is done. It is a curious feature of contemporary legal
education that the first year of law school is still so heavily organized
around doctrinal analysis of classic cases in the basic areas of contracts, property, torts, criminal law, and civil procedure. There is too
often an implicit, if not an explicit, message conveyed to most students
that what they bring with them from their earlier education, which is
usually the stuff of the interdisciplinary work in law, is not fully relevant to the study and practice of law. The cases contain little direct
3. I refer to this practice not for its intrinsic value but as an example of the intimate engagement of faculty in the teaching enterprise.
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reference to other fields. Though the notes after the cases do frequently try to draw upon interdisciplinary knowledge, as do many
teachers during class time, the primary focus, day after day, is the next
set of legal doctrines and the development of the skill of critical analysis and effective advocacy.
Students learn quickly that any effort to develop a sophisticated
grasp of related fields will not be rewarded on the examination, where
spotting issues in a hypothetical case and writing a memorandum of
law outlining the issues and stating the conclusion or advice remains
the primary method by which we grade students. The standard upperclass courses on the whole do not vary significantly from this model.
Coverage of doctrine and fields of law is the predominant classroom
activity.
The fundamental problem facing modem law schools, therefore, is
precisely how to combine the coverage of doctrine and the development of skills of critical and careful reasoning, with the integration of
the extensive and growing knowledge of related fields that have come
to inform so much of the scholarship emanating from the academy,
and the role law plays beyond the appellate court. Despite the somewhat popular view, represented in Judge Edwards' article, about the
nondoctrinal character of the average law school class, the situation is
actually quite the reverse.
But, that said, I remain convinced that law schools are institutions
of integrity, as I have defined that standard. Perhaps the best test of
this would be to ask those practitioners who have recently visited and
taught in major law schools what they think about the state of our
institutions. Over the years I have invited several leading practicing
lawyers to teach at Michigan. I believe that every one of them would
say, even in private, that the present health oflaw schools is very high,
that students are being well-served, that in all that is done there is a
seriousness of purpose and a public spiritedness that is highly
admirable.
I want to conclude with both an acknowledgment and some difficult observations, which are not offered and I hope are not taken in the
spirit of retaliation. I would agree with Judge Edwards that there is
less in today's legal scholarship offering help to judges disposing of
cases on their dockets than in earlier generations. I have cautioned
against overstating this decline and have disagreed with a number of
conclusions Judge Edwards draws from it about the character of law
schools. I also think that probably much of what he might call "theory" I would say can, in fact, be helpful to judges. Holmes was right,
in my view, when he said there is nothing more practical than a good
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theory. But the lessening of dialogue between the legal academic
world and the judiciary is nonetheless a reality, and, at least in part, an
unfortunate one. One cause, no doubt, is the shift in legal scholarship
to which Judge Edwards points.
But, to my mind, a greater part is due to another change, and that
concerns the nature of judging in this society. The fact, in other
words, that legal scholarship is directed less to judges and more to
other audiences is the result not only of changes in the composition of
legal scholars and of new and important intellectual commitments, as
I have suggested, but also of changes within the judiciary that make it
a less appealing audience.
In recent years the judiciary has been a beleaguered institution.
The decline in judicial salaries relative to those in the academy and the
practicing bar; the increase in the politicization of the appointments
process during the 1980s - especially by the effort to pack the judiciary with young judges of a particular ideological bent; the enormous
increase in the workload of judges and the increase in the amount of
tedious issues; the reported decline of collegiality among judges on the
same court; the lessening of personal engagement of judges with the
creative side of the office, manifested primarily in the growing reliance
on law clerks to write opinions - or first drafts of opinions - and
other similar forms of bureaucratization; and, finally, the trend within
the judiciary away from the judicial activism of the Warren Court era.
These changes in all candor make the judiciary a less interesting subject for legal scholarship; all the changes have weakened the interest of
those in the academy in thinking about what judges are doing and in
engaging judges in dialogue.
Part of the growing gap between the judges and the professors, in
other words, is the product of a perceived decline in the intellectual
interest of judging and of a declining sense of identification with the
position of judge within the society. Law professors used to identify
more closely with the life of a judge, especially a federal judge. When
I began teaching in the early 1970s, the aspiration of many law professors was to be a judge on a federal court of appeals. Indeed, the salary
of a senior law professor was pegged to that of a court of appeals
judge, symbolically indicating the sense of shared identity and mission
within the life of the law. Today the feelings within law schools are
considerably different. While few faculty would turn down a judicial
position if offered, very few would accept without ambivalence, without a sense of loss over how this once would have felt like a crowning
professional achievement but does no more.
From a scholarly point of view, this means that there is less inter-
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est in following and responding to the writings coming out of the
courts. More accurately, scholarly engagement with judicial work is
more likely to take the perspective of detached and strong criticism,
instead of reflecting a sense of shared mission with judges. Judges
seem less reachable, as well as less interesting. There are, of course,
and everyone knows this, exceptions among judges (notably Judge Edwards). But it is the general sense of what judges and the judicial
process are like that determines the general character of legal
scholarship.
What this means, then, is that at the very same time that there has
been an intellectual explosion about what is truly relevant to thinking
about law, there has been a decline, or perceived decline, of intellectual interest in what judges do. While in law schools law seems richer
and more complex, in the courts law has become more mundane, more
quotidian, more like the dull products of the administrative agency
system. Judges themselves bear some of the responsibility for this
state of affairs, though surely not all of it. I sense that, especially with
the tendency exhibited over the past decades to give a high priority to
prior judicial experience in making appointments to the bench, that we
are heading towards a professionalized judiciary, similar in character
to the bench in the civil law systems. That, I must say, does not bode
well for the wish to reestablish closer intellectual ties between the
academy and the judiciary. Nor does it bode well for society.

